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The conflict between the goals of environmental preservation and
relatively free access to communities has been fought for the past dec-
ade on the battleground of the exclusionary zoning cases. In these
cases, the courts have balanced the general welfare of the region against
the welfare of particular communities which sought to further their
aesthetic and environmental values by limiting population growth
through zoning.
There are indications that the battleground is about to shift. New
attempts to preserve the environment by restricting access may be made
through the use of the taxing and spending power, rather than through
the police power, and future access claims may be based on the con-
stitutional right to travel. To accommodate these important competing
interests, this Note will recommend the adoption of a flexible right to
travel test that will insure adequate judicial review of fiscal power ex-
clusionary measures but which will also protect legitimate and neces-
sary local legislation. The first section of the Note will discuss the con-
stitutional doctrine of freedom of travel. The second section will then
apply the travel right to exclusionary zoning laws. Finally, the third
section will consider various fiscal power exclusionary devices and how
the courts might deal with them through the travel doctrine.
I. Freedom of Travel
A. Freedom of Travel and Equal Protection
Most of the Supreme Court's recent cases concerning freedom of
travel have involved claims of a denial of equal protection. The sem-
inal case in this line of decisions is Shapiro v. Thompson.1 There, the
legislative classification was a one year residency requirement as a con-
dition of eligibility for welfare payments, which penalized or dis-
criminated against those welfare applicants who had recently moved
into the state. The Court explicitly held that freedom of travel was
a fundamental right, and therefore concluded that under the Equal
Protection Clause the classification scheme had to further a compelling
state interest.2 After stating that a governmental purpose to deter travel
1. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
2. Under the traditional equal protection standard, the government need justify a
classification by showing only some possible rational reason for the distinction. McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). However, when the regulation creates a classification
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was impermissible, the Court found that the other state interests were
not sufficiently compelling to justify the statute.3 This analysis has
later been applied by the Court to invalidate similar residency re-
quirements for voter eligibility4 and for the provision of public med-
ical services to indigents.5
Shapiro is important because it clearly recognizes the existence of
a fundamental right to travel." However, Shapiro and its progeny apply
only to situations where the state has classified or discriminated against
individuals on the basis of their exercise of this fundamental right. The
equal protection analysis employed in these cases is inapplicable to
other situations in which the right to travel is deterred or penalized.
In order to determine whether freedom of travel can be applied in
contexts other than equal protection, and to formulate an appropriate
which is considered "suspect," such as race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964);
when the classification denies one the exercise of a fundamental right, Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (voting); or when the classification "penalizes" or
discriminates on the basis of the exercise of a fundamental right as in Shapiro (travel);
the government must demonstrate a "compelling state interest." For a discussion of
more recent Supreme Court decisions in the equal protection area and an analysis of the
future of the "two-tier" system, see Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972);
note 24 infra.
3. 394 U.S. at 627.
4. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Dunn reaffirmed the holding in Shapiro
and pointed out that actual deterrence of travel need not be shown when the state has
classified individuals on the basis of the exercise of a constitutional right. Id. at 339-41.
See Case Note, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 914.
5. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). The first major break
in this consistent line of equal protection cases came in Sosna v. Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553(1975), in which the Court upheld Iowa's one-year residency requirement for state divorce
proceedings. The Court found that access to the divorce courts was "of a different
stripe" than eligibility for welfare aid or medical treatment, and that Iowa's state interests
outweighed any possible deterrence of travel. Prior to Sosna, numerous challenges to
durational residency requirements for access to state divorce proceedings had been filed
in state and federal courts. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alas. 1974) and cases
cited therein. As of May 1974, eight federal and state courts had upheld the residency
requirements and four had invalidated them. Id. at 1127.
6. 394 U.S. at 629-31, 634. See also cases cited in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250, 254 n.7 (1974). The exact parameters of the right to travel are yet to be
determined by the Court. In Shapiro, the Court dealt with travel in the sense of
permanent movement to change residence, and did not consider the question of whether
other, more temporary movement was also constitutionally protected. In Memorial
Hospital, the Court emphasized that "[w]hatever its ultimate scope... the right to
travel was involved in only a limited sense in Shapiro. The Court was there concerned
only with the right to migrate, 'with the intent to settle and abide'...." Id. at 254-55.
Similarly, the Court has yet to decide whether freedom of travel includes intrastate as
well as interstate movement. In Memorial Hospital, the Court refrained from deciding
this point, but concluded that a county durational residency requirement for free medical
care was unconstitutional because it penalized interstate travel. Id. at 255-56. At least one
court of appeals has concluded that intrastate travel is a "fundamental" right, King v.
New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 863 (1971). See also Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (1970) (municipal
residency requirement for public housing invalidated as an infringement on the right to
travel, where one of the two plaintiffs had moved to the city from within the state);
note 38 infra.
A discussion of the constitutional definition of "travel" is beyond the scope of this
Note. For an elaboration of these issues, see sources in note 7 infra.
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standard for such cases, it is necessary to concentrate on the earlier
travel decisions of the Supreme Court and to draw analogies from
precedents in other areas such as interstate commerce and First Amend-
ment rights.
B. Development of the Travel Doctrine
The early development of freedom of travel had its roots in the
Commerce Clause.7 The need for a free movement of both goods and
people among the states was explicitly recognized in the Articles of
Confederation," and although the right of "free ingress and egress to
and from any other state" was not referred to in the Constitution,
the Supreme Court has maintained the connection between travel and
commerce.
Crandall v. Nevada,9 the first case explicitly to affirm the right
to travel, dealt with a tax on the transportation of individuals out
of a state. The Court analogized travel to interstate commerce, but
concluded that the right to travel to the seat of the Government was
a separate and distinct right.10 Although it was not alleged in that
case that anyone was attempting to travel to Washington or any other
federal office, the Court apparently concluded that the need for in-
dividuals to travel to the seat of their government was sufficient to
justify a right to travel anywhere in the United States."
In Edwards v. California12 the Court abandoned the "seat of gov-
ernment" reasoning and instead relied solely upon the interstate com-
merce clause to invalidate a state statute which prohibited bringing
indigents into the state. The language used by the Court, however,
pointed to a higher interest than the free flow of goods. It emphasized
the need for each state to face the social problems that beset all the
7. This Note will neither discuss in detail the historical foundations of freedom of
travel, nor attempt to assign the doctrine to a particular clause of the Constitution. For
a discussion of these issues, see Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONST5TUTION
162-213 (1956); Note, The Right to Travel-Quest for a Constitutional Source, 6 RUT.-
CAm. L.J. 122 (1974).
8. Articles of Confederation, art. IV (1781).
9. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
10. 73 U.S. at 44.
11. The Court relied on Chief Justice Taney's dissent in the Passenger Cases. Smith
v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849):
We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community,
must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption,
as freely as in our own States. And a tax imposed by a State for entering its ter-
ritories or harbours, is inconsistent with the rights which belong to citizens of other
States as members of the Union, and with the objects which that Union was intended
to attain.
See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915).
12. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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states, rather than to close its doors in an effort to isolate itself from
those problems.'3 In concurring opinions, Justices Jackson and Doug-
las urged the Court to declare explicitly that the right of free move-
ment was a right guaranteed to all citizens as a necessary corollary of
the federal system of government. 14
But whether freedom of travel is called a separate federal right or
an aspect of federal power over interstate commerce, both freedom
of travel and interstate commerce serve the same purpose in slightly
different areas. By providing for federal control over interstate com-
merce, the Constitution insured that economic problems could be
tackled on a national scale, and that one state could not maximize
its own economic welfare at the expense of the rest of the states. In
the same way, the Edwards court, by allowing the free movement of
the self-sufficient and the indigent alike, required that the problems
of poverty and unlimited growth be confronted by the states as a
whole, rather than as individual entities with the discretion to relegate
the problems to other states5.'
Of course, each state is still left with the power to handle its own
13. [T]here are boundaries to the permissible area of state legislative activity...
And none is more certain than the prohibition against attempts on the part of any
single State to isolate itself from difficulties common to all of them by restraining
the transportation of persons and property across its borders. It is frequently the
case that a state might gain a momentary respite from the pressure of events by the
simple expedient of shutting its gates to the outside world. But, in the words of
Mr. Justice Cardozo: "The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political
philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples
of the several States must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity
and salvation are in union and not division." Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523.
314 U.S. at 173-74.
14. Justice Jackson stated:
This Court should, however, hold squarely that it is a privilege of citizenship of the
United States, protected from state abridgement, to enter any state of the union,
either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent residence therein
and for gaining resultant citizenship thereof. If national citizenship means less than
this, it means nothing.
314 U.S. at 183 (concurring).
In a separate concurrence, Justice Douglas asserted:
[T]he right of persons to move freely from state to state occupies a more protected
position in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit and
coal across state lines.
Id. at 177.
15. The Edwards Court stated, for example, that
the theory of the Elizabethan poor laws no longer fit the facts. Recent years, and
particularly the past decade, have been marked by a growing recognition that in an
industrial society the task of providing assistance to the needy has ceased to be local
in character. The duty to share the burden, if not wholly to assume it, has been
recognized not only by State governments, but by the Federal government as well ....
.What has been said with respect to financing relief is not without bearing upon
the regulation of the transportation of indigent persons. For the social phenomenon
of large-scale interstate migration is as certainly a matter of national concern as the
provision of assistance to those who have found a permanent or temporary abode.
314 U.S. at 174-75.
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economic and social problems as it sees fit, but its power does not
extend to use of isolation as a method of dealing with those problems.
Thus, a state may not maximize its own economic welfare by pre-
venting the sale of goods made in other states.' 6 Similarly, a state may
not prevent individuals of other states from entering to share in its
economic or aesthetic good fortune.' 7 In both cases, constitutional
doctrine has determined that the long term welfare is maximized by
interaction and not by insulation.
C. A Proposed Standard: The Balancing-Means Test
No elaborate standard was necessary in Crandall or Edwards to pro-
tect freedom of travel; direct infringements such as absolute prohibi-
tions or taxes upon travel caused the Court little trouble. The situa-
tion becomes more complicated, however, when state measures which
are designed to promote the general welfare have the indirect effect
of inhibiting travel. The Shapiro doctrine was developed to deal with
one such impediment-a classification scheme, designed to promote a
legitimate state objective, which penalized those who had engaged in
travel. However, in contexts other than equal protection, courts need
a standard by which to judge governmental action which does not di-
rectly involve or focus on travel, but which nonetheless hinders or
inhibits this fundamental right. By analogy, the decisions of the Su-
preme Court in the Commerce Clause and First Amendment cases
provide a standard to deal with these indirect burdens.
In situations where a state's exercise of its police power imposes a
burden on interstate commerce or First Amendment rights, the Court
has used a balancing test which weighs the effect on the federal interest
or right against the state interest furthered by the regulation in ques-
tion. In addition to balancing the relative importance of the interests,
the Court has examined the means used by the state to insure that
they do not unnecessarily interfere with the federal right or power.
This balancingmeans standard developed slowly in the interstate
commerce area. State and federal interests were often reconciled on the
basis of artificial labels, instead of a realistic analysis of the particular
factual situation in each case.' 8 Later cases, however, amply demon-
16. See Dean Milk v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
17. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); see notes 13-15 supra.
18. See generally G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES AND 'MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 614-58 (8th ed. 1970). When faced with state statutes which affected interstate com-
merce, the Court initially sought to determine whether the purpose of the statute was to
deal with legitimate state interests or to regulate commerce, City of New York ". Miln,
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 132-38 (1837); whether the regulation affected a subject which was
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strate the use of the balancing-means standard. State safety or environ-
mental interests are weighed against the burden upon the free move-
ment of interstate carriers, and the regulations themselves are examined
to insure that they further those state interests without making the
commerce prohibitively expensive or exposing commerce to inconsis-
tent regulations. 19 The Court also scrutinizes the means adopted by
the state to achieve its interest, and the regulation is held invalid if
an alternative is available to the state which is less burdensome on
interstate commerce. 20
This same balancing-means standard has been applied in cases where
the state seeks to further a legitimate interest in a manner which in-
terferes with First Amendment rights. The Court has stated that the
state interest must be "substantial" or "compelling" in order to coun-
terbalance the First Amendment interest, and that the state must
choose narrow and carefully "tailored" means to achieve this interest.21
"local" or "national" in scope, Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319
(1851); or whether the statute had a "direct" or "indirect" effect on commerce, Smith v.
Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888), DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927), over-
ruled, California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 115-16 (1941). In a prophetic dissent in Di-
Santo, Justice Stone suggested that the Court dwell less on such labels and instead weigh
several factors, including "the nature of the regulation, its function, the character of the
business involved and the actual effect on the flow of commerce...." Id. at 44.
19. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), in which the Court weighed
the value of safety furthered by an ordinance limiting the length of trains against the
possible disruption of interstate commerce:
The decisive question is whether in the circumstances the total effect of the law as
a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as
not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from
interferences ....
Id. at 775-76; Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 372
U.S. 714, 718-22 (1963); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44, 448
(1960); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959). Such a balancing
standard requires a case-by-case determination based on the particular facts of each
case. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., supra at 719.
In general, however, the Court's main concern is whether the regulation in question
creates the potential for significant conflicts with the regulation of other states. See, e.g.,
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., supra at 529-30.
20. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (city cannot dis-
criminate against milk imported from outside the state "even in the exercise of its un-
questioned power to protect the health and safety of its people, if reasonable nondis-
criminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available");
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, supra
note 18, at 657-58.
21. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 (1972) (regulation must be
"tailored to a substantial governmental interest" and not be discriminatory on the basis
of content); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (regulation before the Court "furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest" and "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest"); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (there must be a "substantial regulatory interest");
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (state interest must be "compelling");
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1954) (effect of the legislation before
the Court is not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (state may not choose the regulation which is unneces-
sarily broad in application and restrictive of First Amendment rights); note 27 infra.
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By using this standard in the commerce and First Amendment areas,
the Court is freed from the need to find the "true" purpose of the
state regulation. The Court may accept the enunciated state purpose
at face value and then determine for itself whether that purpose is
best achieved by the challenged regulation.2 2 If it chooses, however,
it may conclude that the purpose is unconstitutional because the ob-
vious effect of the regulation is not to further the stated interests,
but to inhibit constitutional rights. 23
The use of the balancing-means standard in interstate commerce
cases suggests that the same standard should apply to freedom of travel,
given that the considerations favoring relatively unrestricted movement
of goods also apply to movement of individuals. Furthermore, freedom
of travel is a fundamental right, and, as indicated in the First Amend-
ment cases, the balancing-means standard is invoked when state in-
terests conflict with such rights.24 Moreover, recent dictum from the
22. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), for example, the Court found that the
application of a Virginia champerty statute to the NAACP unduly restricted the freedom
of association of the NAACP's members. The Court found that the state interests ad-
vanced by Virginia were neither sufficiently compelling nor narrow in scope to justify
the inhibition of First Amendment rights. Because of this decision the majority found it
unnecessary to "reach the considerations of race or racial discrimination" which were
raised by petitioner. Id. at 444. Justice Douglas, on the other hand, felt that the act
"reflects a legislative purpose to penalize the NAACP because it promotes desegregation
of the races." Id. at 445 (concurring).
23. Cf. Griffen v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964) (purpose of state statute
allowing county to close public schools could only be to ensure segregated education):
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 441 (1960) (the Court, after examining the in-
evitable effect of a town redistricting ordinance, stated that "the conclusion would be
irresistable ... that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored
voters...."). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (an ordinance is
unconstitutional if it has as its purpose the exclusion of indigents from the state).
24. The two-tier structure of the equal protection doctrine (see note 2 supla) may
also be undergoing a shift toward the application of a balancing-means test. Instead of
increasing the number of "suspect classifications" and "fundamental" rights, the Court
has begun to determine for itself both the purpose of a state regulation and whether the
classification achieves that purpose without unduly burdening the disfavored class. Thus,
the Court seems to be steering toward a middle ground of required nexus between the
easily demonstrable "rational" nexus and the essentially undemonstrable "compelling"
state interest. For examples of these trends, see Stanton v. Stanton, 95 S. Ct. 170 (1975);
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 161
(1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Gunther,
supra note 2.
Such a relaxation in the rigid two-tier system of equal protection may result in a
more flexible approach in durational residency cases. The recent case of Sosna v. Iowa,
95 S. Ct. 553 (1975), may be the first in a series of steps in that direction. Instead of re-
quiring a compelling state interest to uphold the state residency requirement for divorce,
the Court applied a balancing approach which weighed the importance of the benefit
denied to recent residents against the state interest in denying it. Indeed, the majority
refrained from even using the two-tier terminology of "rational nexus" and "compelling
state interest." The dissent clearly recognized this shift:
The Court's failure to address the instant case in these terms suggests a new di,,-
taste for the mode of analysis we have applied to this corner of equal protection
law. In its stead, the Court has emplo)ed what appears to be ail ad hoc balancing
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Supreme Court seems to support the notion that the right to travel
is protected under a balancing-means test. In Dunn v. Blumstein,25
the Court struck down a voting residency requirement as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause because it penalized those who had ex-
ercised their right to travel. But the Court went on to indicate that
fundamental rights must not be inhibited by state regulations which
do not further substantial interests and which are not narrowly drawn
to minimize their effect on such rights. In support of that position,
the Court cited NAACP v. Button,2c a major example of the use of
the balancing-means test in a First Amendment context.
The balancing-means standard provides a flexible accommodation
of the competing interests in the travel area.27 It enables the Court
test, under which the State's putative interest in insuring that its divorce plaintiffs
establish some roots in Iowa is said to justify the one-year residency requirement.
Id. at 567 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus it appears that the Court may eventually discard
the equal protection terminology completely and simply weigh the rights involved against
the state interests under a standard similar to that proposed in this Note, so that the
same standard would be used for all freedom of travel cases. For a slightly different view
of the appropriate standard in the different types of travel cases, see Note, supra note 7.
25. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
26. The Dunn court stated:
iT]he state cannot choose means that unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally
protected activity. Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with "pre-
cision," NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ... and must be "tailored" to
serve their legitimate objectives ... And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve
those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a state may
not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose "less
drastic means."
405 U.S. at 343.
27. The reason the balancing-means test is used in either the interstate commerce or
the First Amendment area is "not because some novel, particular rule of law obtains in
cases of this kind," Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 493 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing), but because it is the only way to accommodate conflicting interests. While the
general method of analysis should always be the same, the strictness of the test will vary
according to the interests to be reconciled. At one extreme, the test becomes the mere
"rational nexus" requirement, where such a strong presumption of validity is given to
the regulation in question that it will almost always be upheld. At the other extreme
the test becomes one of "compelling state interest" where the regulation is essentially
presumed to be invalid. The problem with both extremes is that they no longer represent
modes of analysis, but instead are mere conclusory labels. What is needed is an explicit
use of the balancing-means test where the strictness varies according to the substantiality
of the competing interests.
In the interstate commerce area, where state interests are balanced against federal
interests and no specific federal rights of individuals are jeopardized, the Court has
enunciated a relatively lax means test. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S.
520, 524 (1959):
These safety measures carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged in
court. If there are alternative ways of solving a problem, we do not sit to determine
which of them is best suited to achieve a valid state objective.
Nonetheless, the Court in Bibb struck down the state ordinance because it imposed a
burden on interstate commerce and was not shown to be significantly more effective than
alternatives which would not cause such a burden.
The balancing-means test is much stricter when fundamental First Amendment liberties
are involved. In this area the state must act with "precision of regulation," NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); the regulation must be narrowly drawn, Louisiana ex
rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961); and "even though the governmental
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to consider the state interest that is protected by the type of regula-
tion being challenged, and to balance the respective interests and assess
the narrowness of the state's action in the particular circumstances
of each case.
II. Freedom of Travel and Exclusionary Zoning
For the past decade, state courts have been aware of the fact that
the police power can be an effective tool for inhibiting access to com-
munities. Courts have struck down local zoning ordinances which
limited growth in order to reduce financial expenditures or to main-
tain the rural or exclusive nature of the community.28 These ord-
inances are invalidated under the Due Process Clause, as interpreted
by Justice Sutherland in Euclid v. Amber Realty.29 In exercising its
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved," Shelton v. Tucker, supra at 488. See note 21 supra.
In determining the strictness with which the balancing-means test should be used in
the travel area, the application of the test in the interstate commerce and First Amend-
ment cases provides the relevant parameters. On the one hand, the test should be at
least as stringent as in the commerce area, because society values the free movement of
people at least as much as it does the free movement of goods. See pp. 1566-67 supra.
Moreover, mobility is essential to the national market sought to be protected by the
Commerce Clause, in that it helps to ensure an available labor supply. On the other hand,
freedom of travel, while a fundamental right, has never been held to occupy the "pre-
ferred position" that the First Amendment does. Travel does, however, promote First
Amendment values by increasing associational opportunities, enhancing the ability to
disseminate ideas, and protecting the right to petition the government for redress of
grievances. See p. 1566 supra. Furthermore, the right to choose one's place of residence
is an important value in itself, akin to the First Amendment objective of allowing in-
dividual self-fulfillment. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THlE Fwir
AMENDMENT 4-7 (1966). This value is most important when people are striving for better
opportunities and new employment, particularly since these people are usually very
vulnerable to state exclusionary or inhibitory regulations. While of less importance, the
right to seek a more comfortable place to live should also be protected to some degree.
The economically and socially secure should have the opportunity to move to safe neigh-
borhoods with good schools for their children, or to enjoy a vacation home in a scenic
rural area.
In any particular freedom of travel case, the strictness of the means requirement and
the ultimate result of balancing must depend on the substantiality of both the travel
claim and the countervailing state policy. But in every case, the court should explicitly
weigh the competing interests and examine the possibility of other, less burdensome
means to further the local concerns, instead of basing its decision on conclusory labels.
28. See, e.g., Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d 567
(1971) (lot size regulations); Lakeland Bluff Inc. v. County of Will, 114 Ill. App. 2d 267,
252 N.E.2d 765 (App. Ct. 1969) (restrictions on mobile homes); Bristow v. City of Wood-
haven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 NAV.2d 322 (1971) (exclusion of mobile homes); Oakwood
at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (L. Div.
1971) (lot size requirements and restrictions on multiple units); Molino v. Mayor &
Council, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (L. Div. 1971) (restrictions on multiple
units); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (restrictions on multiple units);
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (lot size requirements);
Town of Glocester v. Olivo's Home Court, Inc., 111 R.I. 120, 300 A.2d 465 (1973) (re-
striction on mobile homes); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107
S.E.2d 390 (1959) (lot size requirements).
29. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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police power, the state must further the "public health, safety, morals
and general welfare"30 if its actions are not to be considered an ar-
bitrary deprivation of property. The courts have seized upon this lan-
guage to require municipalities to zone in a "reasonable" manner
which furthers the general welfare. They conclude that although it
may be in the interest of the present residents to build walls around
their communities and divert population movement, it is not in the
general welfare of the region, which must accommodate those looking
for housing.31
In each of these cases, the municipality asserted that the zoning
scheme furthered an important community interest. In evaluating such
claims, the courts rejected those reasons which were based on financial
considerations or a desire simply to keep the community small.32 How-
ever, interests such as environmental preservation were considered to
be important, justifiable goals. When such interests were presented,
the courts engaged in a balancing test in which the community in-
terests were weighed against both the landowners' right to the rela-
tively unencumbered use of their land and the region's need for the
accommodation of increased population. But the interests were not
weighed in the abstract; the court only balanced the community inter-
ests as they were furthered by the means chosen. An ordinance would
be invalidated if the court concluded that the means chosen either
did not further the enunciated interests or that it furthered them in
a manner which was unnecessarily restrictive of growth. 33 In addition,
the strictness of the means test depended on the importance of both
the community interests and the access claim. Thus, a community
which has unique ecological assets and which is faced with large num-
bers of people seeking to build vacation homes in the area would be
allowed more freedom to choose its means of regulation than a subur-
30. Id. at 395.
31. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11,
20, 283 A.2d 353, 358 (L. Div. 1971); Golden v. Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 383-
93, 285 N.E.2d 291, 305-11, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 156-65 (Breitel, J., dissenting), appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). Appeal of Girsch, 437 Pa. 237, 245 n.4, 263 A.2d 395, 399
n.4 (1970); Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass A Law to Bind the Rights of the
Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 234 (1972).
32. See Kawanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d 567 (1971);
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (L.
Div. 1971).
33. See National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (invalidated
Easttown's four-acre zoning requirement as an unreasonable means of achieving open
space). The court found that the town could have provided open space by using cluster
developments or condemning development rights, and that the minimum lot provision
was chosen to keep down costs and preserve Easttown's scenic beauty for present residents.
Id. at 529-33, 215 A.2d at 610-13.
1573
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 1564, 1975
ban community providing homes near places of employment. 34 As in
the interstate commerce and First Amendment cases, the courts in the
zoning cases were not required to find an exclusionary purpose in
order to strike down the ordinance. However, courts may conclude
that the means chosen reflect such a purpose.33
Because the primary interest being served in the exclusionary zoning
cases is residential access and the accommodation of population growth,
the doctrine of freedom of travel should be applied to protect the
ability of individuals to settle and abide in new communities and
states. 36 One federal court has already ruled that a municipal plan
34. In Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972), the
court upheld a six-acre zoning requirement in a portion of a rural community, conclud-
ing that the free access interest was not sufficient to counterbalance the town's environ-
mental concerns. The court found that the developer in this case was not seeking "to
satisfy an already existing demand for suburban expansion, but rather [was secking to
create a demand in Sanbornton on behalf of wealthy residents of Megalopolis who might
be willing to invest heavily in time and money to gain their own haven in bucolic
surroundings." Id. at 961. Although it upheld the ordinance, the court nonetheless
emphasized that "expansion of population, even a %ery substantial one, seasonal or
permanent," was not by itself a "legitimate basis" for the exclusion of future residents.
In addition, the court expressed concern that the town had sought to deal with its
ecological problems in a "most crude manner" without the aid of any "professional or
scientific study." Despite these facts, the court sustained the ordinance as a stopgap
measure on the basis that, in the present state of uncertainty, the town's ordinance struck
"the right balance between ecological and population pressures."
Id. at 962.
See County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967) (upheld a five-acre
zoning requirement in seven percent of a county that was primarily waterfront and
contained many buildings of considerable historical interest).
35. In Board of County Superiisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1950), the
Virginia supreme court of appeals found that a two-acre zoning requirement in the
western two-thirds of the county was not necessary to preserve ground water and public
health, and that the ordinance served the purpose of channeling population into the
eastern portion "thereby preserving the western area for those who could afford to
build houses on two acres or more." The court concluded that "[s]uch an intentional
and exclusionary purpose would bear no relation to the health, safety, morals, prosperity
and general welfare." 200 Va. at 661, 107 S.E.2d at 396.
36. See Note, The Reconciliation df Land Use Laws and the Right to Travel: Toward
a Realistic Standard of Judicial Review, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 575, 594-603 (1974)
(suggested that freedom of travel be applied to exclusionary zoning cases through the
use of a "heightened rationality standard," which would require local ordinances to be
consistent with regional patterns of natural growth).
The application of the freedom of travel doctrine in exclusionary zoning cases is not
foreclosed by the decision of the Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974), which upheld a town ordinance that allowed only single family dwellings.
The plaintiffs' primary contention was that the ordinance violated the privacy and
associational rights of unrelated persons who wished to live together. Brief for Appellee%
at 21-34. Although the plaintiffs raised the freedom of traxel issue, they did so only to
emphasize the importance of their interest in living in the town. There was no allegation
that the ordinance had either the purpose or effect of limiting the population of the
town. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, concluded that the ordinance "i.
not aimed at transients" and "invohes no fundamental right." 416 U.S. at 6. Thus, Belle
Terre does not seem to resolve the right to tra,.el issue in this area. See Margolis, Ex-
clusionary Zoning: For whom does Belle Terre Toll?, 11 CALIF. ,V.L. REv. 85 (1974)
(argues that Belle Terre was a First Amendment rather than a right to travel case).
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which would artificially limit access to the community was a violation
of the right to travel. 37
In applying the freedom of travel doctrine to exclusionary zoning,
the balancing-means test would be the proper standard. In many cases,
this would be very similar to the test already used under the general
welfare standard of due process. 38 The freedom of travel doctrine is not
merely a substitute for the general welfare test, however. Rather, it
greatly expands the ability of the courts to deal with exclusion. First,
the travel doctrine is adaptable to situations where the general welfare
standard is inapplicable. For example, the legal requirements currently
being applied to municipalities which limit growth would also apply
to the states. If states were to adopt plans to restrict growth, the courts
could require them to show that their reasons were substantial or com-
pelling and that they had chosen the least restrictive means to achieve
the desired purposes. In contrast, the general welfare approach is geared
to maximizing the state's general welfare. Under that test, the inter-
ests of the municipality are balanced against those of the region or
state.39 It is unlikely that the courts which rejected municipal zoning
schemes because they were exclusionary would do the same when
faced with a statewide statute that had an identical effect.
Another advantage of the freedom of travel approach is its appli-
cability to those cases in which exclusion is achieved through means
37. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974)
(growth plan which effectively limited the number of new housing units to 500 per year
from 1971 to 1977). The court cited Shapiro and Dunn, and reasoned that "[i]nasmuch as
there is no meaningful distinction between a law which 'penalizes' the exercise of a
right and one which denies it altogether, it is clear that the growth limitation under
attack may be defended only insofar as it furthers a compelling state interest." Id. at
582 (1974). The court then examined the interests put forward by the town-the need for
adequate sewage facilities and water supply, and the inherent right of a municipality to
control its growth. As to the municipal services, the court concluded that, under the
Dunn mandate, the most tailored means had not been chosen (see note 26 supra) and
that other, less restrictive means were available to solve the problems. Id. at 582-83. As
to the other rationale, the court found that the municipality possessed no inherent right
to control growth, citing Edwards (see notes 12-14 supra) and the decisions of the
Pennsylvania supreme court on exclusionary zoning (see notes 28, 33 supra),. Id. at 583-86.
Thus, although the court still used the terminology of Shapiro, it nonetheless applied
freedom of travel outside the equal protection context, and in so doing engaged in an
approximate balancing-means test similar to that used in the interstate commerce, First
Amendment and exclusionary zoning cases. For a discussion of Petaluma in relation to
other zoning cases, see Smith, Does Petaluma Lie at the End of the Road from Ramapo?,
19 VILL. L. REV. 739 (1974); Case Note, 6 SErON HALL L. REV. 207 (1974).
38. Indeed, in Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D.
Cal. 1974), the court relied in large part on exclusionary zoning cases in reaching its
decision that the city's restrictive growth plan violated freedom of travel. See note 37
supra.
The court arrived at this result without deciding that the right to travel included
intrastate travel. This result seems correct, since a municipal ordinance would inevitably
affect those who were moving to the community from outside the state. See note 6 supra.
39. See p. 1573 supra.
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other than the police power. Although the Due Process Clause may be
invoked to invalidate zoning regulations, its use is severely limited
when the state relies upon its taxing or spending powers to limit
growth. The Supreme Court has long held that a tax is presumed to
be rational and that any attack upon its validity must be based upon
either the tax's failure to raise revenue or its confiscatory nature.4"
The Court is extremely reluctant to declare that a tax is a taking of
property without due process of law or that it is a violation of equal
protection.41 This presumption in favor of validity evaporates, how-
ever, when the tax is challenged as an infringement upon a specific
federal right or power. 42 Taxes which inhibit First Amendment
rights, 43 for example, or which affect interstate commerce 4  are sub-
ject to closer scrutiny. Likewise, taxes which interfere with freedom
of travel would not be presumptively valid.45
Finally, the freedom of travel doctrine is a more realistic approach
than the general welfare test; it places the paramount interest squarely
40. This principle was clearly stated in Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934),
in which a 15 percent tax on the sale of margarine was sustained against due process
and equal protection challenges. The Court held that "the due process clause contained
in the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon
Congress by the Constitution ... and no reason exists for applying a different rule
against a state in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 44. In addition, there
could be no violation of equal protection unless the tax was "so arbitrary as to compel
the conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes,
in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as for
example, confiscation of property." Id. Any requirement that the tax serve a public pur-
pose "has regard to the use which is to be made of the revenue derived from the tax,
and not to any ulterior motive or purpose which may have influenced the legislature in
passing the act." Id. at 43. See also City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S.
369, 373 (1974) (citing Mafgnano approvingly and stating that courts should refuse "either
to undertake the task of passing on the 'reasonableness' of a tax that otherwise is within
the power of Congress or of state legislative authorities, or to hold that a tax is un-
constitutional because it renders a business unprofitable").
41. See, e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, rehearing denied,
411 U.S. 910 (1973); accord, Austin v. New Hampshire, 95 S. Ct. 1191 (1975); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974).
42. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973):
Where taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from equal protec-
tion, is imperiled, the States have large leeway in making classification and drawing
lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation.
(emphasis added); Austin v. New Hampshire, 95 S. Ct. 1191 (1975); Allied Stores v. Bowers,
358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959).
43. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
44. See, e.g., Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
45. For examples of taxes on travel that were not viewed as presumptively valid, see
Evansville Airport v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 405 U.S. 707 (1972); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 35 (1867). However, most taxes would probably not be invalidated as exclusionary
devices. First, the tax must have a sufficient effect upon the ability of persons to travel
or settle to outbalance the strong state interest in raising revenue. Second, in recognition
of this important state interest, the courts should not apply a very strict means test in
determining whether less burdensome alternatives to raise revenue are available. See
pp. 1574-75 supra. Nonetheless, under the freedom of travel doctrine, courts would at least
have to consider the competing interests and the means used to achieve the state purpose,
rather than simply immunizing taxing measures from judicial scrutiny.
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upon the right of individuals to move freely into communities. The
present general welfare approach rests upon an artificial construction
of the Due Process Clause. Justice Sutherland's admonition in Euclid
was probably based on a desire to protect the landowner from an
unreasonable limitation upon property rights. 40 Because of this, in
all of the exclusionary zoning cases, the ordinance is attacked by the
landowner as an unreasonable taking of property without due process
of law.47 Thus, if a landowner's monetary interests are not harmed
by the zoning regulation, the court may well conclude that there has
been no taking of property; 48 and it may so conclude without any
need to consider the interests of those who may desire access to the
community, but who are effectively excluded by the zoning plan. In
contrast, a court faced with a challenge based on freedom of travel
would balance free access against legitimate local interests, without
having to consider the effect of the ordinance on any particular land-
owner. The municipality's ordinance could thus be challenged by
people outside the community as well as by those whose property was
affected by the regulation.49
III. Fiscal Power Exclusionary Measures and Application
of the Balancing-Means Test
In addition to zoning under the police power, state and local gov-
ernments have a variety of fiscal tools which they might use effectively
46. See pp. 1572-73 supra. Although the Court was concerned with the effect of the
municipal ordinance on "the general public interest," 272 U.S. at 390, it first examined
the question of whether the ordinance significantly reduced the value of the plaintiff's
property. Id. at 384.
47. In all of the cases cited in note 28 supra, the suit was brought by either the
owner of the land or one who had an equitable interest in the land. See, e.g., National
Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 513-14, 215 A.2d. 597, 603 (1965) (plaintiffs had
standing because they had already expended more than $6,000 in developing the land
and had entered into an agreement to buy the land if a zoning change was made). See
also County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 364, 228 A.2d 450, 454 (1967) (plaintiff land-
owners had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the local zoning ordinance
because "it is more difficult to sell five acre lots than lots of three acres or less, and that
the resale value of Blakeford, for development purposes, is decreased by its zoning
classification"). In Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11,
283 A.2d 353 (L. Div. 1971), the suit was brought by both the developer and a group
of potential residents in the proposed development. The court did not address the issue
of whether the future residents alone would have sufficient standing to bring the suit.
48. The landowner need not show that the zoning ordinance is confiscatory in order
to challenge its reasonableness. See Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 241 n.3, 263 A.2d 395, 397
n.3 (1970). However, the Pennsylvania supreme court considers deprivation to the land-
owner as the starting point in its analysis of the reasonableness of the zoning plan. Only
after this deprivation is shown does the court proceed to determine whether the ordinance
is in furtherance of the general welfare. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504,
524-25, 215 A.2d 597, 608 (1965).
49. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 581-82 (N.D. Cal.
1974) (did not require the plaintiffs to show that they were landowners, but instead
allowed a voluntary association of builders to sue).
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to limit growth, and each of these would be immune from review un-
der the general welfare standard. One possible method would be a
gains tax, which would tax the seller on the profits made from the
sale of residential land or buildings. Such a tax could produce exactly
the same exclusionary effect as a large acreage zoning requirement,
in that both devices artificially increase the cost of moving into the
community. A gains tax may be more popular with present residents,
however, since the revenue it raised might allow a reduction in the
annual property taxes. Those residents with no intention of moving
would be benefited most by such a tax, but even those who planned
to move sometime would approve of the plan if it included an ex-
emption for those sellers who lived on the property they were selling.
Such an exemption would place the entire tax burden upon those
people who build new housing and those who buy that housing. In
addition, the exemption would allow present owners to charge a higher
price for their homes, since the increase in the cost of new construc-
tion would enhance the market value of the older residents. A similar
technique would be to enact a simple transfer tax, based upon a certain
percentage of the total sale price regardless of gain or loss. Like the
gains tax, it could be designed so that only the developer and the
owners of new homes would pay the tax, rather than the owners of
existing dwellings. 50 A third fiscal method of exclusion would be the
creation of tax incentives, similar to those granted to farmers to main-
tain agricultural land.51 These incentives are generally viewed favor-
50. States clearly have this power. However, most municipal governments probably
are not authorized to enact either a gains tax or a significant transfer tax. The constitu-
tional and statutory schemes of many states contemplate annual municipal property taxes
with certain percentage limits, but allow municipal transfer taxes only in particular
circumstances and with strict percentage limits. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-1 (Supp.
1974); N.Y. CONST. art. VIII; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5705.03 (1973); PA. ST.AT. ANN. tit.
53, §§ 6902, 6908 (1972); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-758, 760 (1974). Pennsylvania, for example,
permits municipalities to tax the transfer of real estate when the owner sells his home to
a residential builder who is providing a newly built home for the seller, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 6902(1) (1972), but the limit on this tax is one percent. PA. S"AT. ANN. tit. 53,§ 6903(5) (1972).
It is not inconceivable, however, that state legislatures might change such tax laws
under sufficient pressure from residents of suburban communities. A recent example of
this type of pressure is the New York state legislature's restriction upon the power it
had previously given to the Urban Development Corporation to override local zoning
laws in the planning of new residential developments. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6265(5)
(McKinney Supp. 1973).
New Jersey's Governor Brendan T. Byrne is currently considering the use of a statewide
real estate transfer tax. The tax is being considered as a method of raising revenue to
allow the state to buy the development rights to land currently used for agricultural
purposes. It is not clear, however, whether the tax is also meant to be part of a double-
edged weapon to limit development in the state by inhibiting the transfer of land.
Newark Star Ledger, July 3, 1974, at 25, col. 1.
51. Several states have enacted such farm zone taxation in an effort to preserve open
space. The New Jersey Farmland Assessment Act of 1964, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:4-23.1 to
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ably as an effort to insure open space and greenbelts. But like all
measures designed to preserve the environment, they may also be used
to limit access to a community or state. Although the effect on the
landowner would be beneficial, the effect on those wishing to move
into an area would be the same as that of an ordinance which zones
a large portion of a municipality as agricultural or residential, with
five and 10 acre lot requirements. Furthermore, either independently
or coupled with such a tax incentive for no development, tax reduc-
tions for developments of a particular density could be enacted. Under
this approach, landowners who sold part of their land subject to re-
strictive covenants that set minimum acreage requirements for indi-
vidual lots could receive a tax reduction on the remaining land they
held. Finally, the town or state could choose to buy the land or the
development rights, thereby enabling it to control future develop-
ment.52
In order to illustrate the application of the balancing-means test to
fiscal power exclusionary measures a statewide land gains tax will be
used as an example5 3 It will be assumed that the goals of such a
tax are environmental preservation and revenue raising. Assume fur-
ther that the tax rate depends on two variables: the length of time
the land is held and the amount of profit made on the sale; the longer
the land is held by the seller, the lower the rate, and the greater the
profit, the higher the rate. Those sellers who have used their land
as permanent residences are exempt from the tax.54 Finally the pro-
4-35. (Supp. 1973), for example, allows for the assessment of farmland at its farming value.
In order to qualify, the land must be used for farm purposes for two successive years
and it must be not less than five acres. For an early discussion of the feasibility of such
plans, see Note, Techniques for Preserving Open Space, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1622, 1641-42
(1962). See also Sullivan, The Greening of the Taxpayer: The Relationship of Farm Zone
Taxation In Oregon to Land Use, 9 WiLL4MrET-E L.J. 1 (1973).
52. The American Law Institute's proposed Model Land Development Code contains
a tentative provision on land banking which would grant condemnation powers to a
State Land Reserve Agency for the purpose of "achieving the land policy and land
planning objectives of (the] State." ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, art. 6, 261-80
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1974). See note 50 supra, for a discussion of land banking proposals
in New Jersey. The possible use of land banking for exclusionary purposes has been
recognized. See Note, Judicial Review of Land Bank Dispositions, 41 U. Cnr. L. REV. 377,
381-82 (1974).
53. In April 1973, Vermont enacted a statewide land gains tax. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,§§ 5961-77, 10001-10 (Supp. 1974). The Vermont tax, which applies only to land, § 10001,
is sharply graduated; the longer the land is held, the lower the rate, and the greater the
profit, the higher the rate. § 10003. For a discussion of the Vermont tax plan, see Note,
49 WASH. L. REV. 1159 (1974).
54. As originally enacted, the Vermont tax exempted only that land which the seller
used as his principle residence, so that land which was sold for permanent homes, but
which was newly developed, was subject to the tax. Law of Apr. 23, 1973, no. 81, §
10002, [1973] Vt. Stat., 5 ENVIRON. L. INSTITUTE, ENVIRON. L. REP. 43031 (Mar. 1975). This
situation was changed when the act was amended to extend the exemption to all land
."not exceeding five acres, necessary for the use of a dwelling which is to be used as
the purchaser's principal residence." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10002. (emphasis added)..
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ceeds of the tax are put in a property tax relief fund which, together
with federal revenue-sharing funds, will be used for rebates to those
who pay property taxes that are higher than a certain percentage of
their annual income.55
The most obvious effect of the tax will be to reduce land speculation
drastically. 6 Speculators buy land for the sole purpose of resale and
they rely upon a relatively rapid turnover of land in order to avoid
an accumulation of property taxes and interest on purchase money
mortgages0 7 Under the gains tax, however, the large profits and short
holding periods would subject the speculator to a high tax rate. In
addition, the speculator would find it difficult to procure a buyer,
since a developer (who is the most likely purchaser) would also be
subject to the tax upon sale of the finished parcels.
It is this effect on the developer which results in a limitation on
access to the state. A developer, like a speculator, relies upon the
rapid resale of land. Interest costs, property taxes, and the need for
immediate cash flows compel the developer to subdivide immediately
and begin selling completed parcels as soon as possible. 5s However,
This change greatly reduced the exclusionary effect of the tax by exempting developers
from the tax when they sell homes which will be used by the purchasers as principal
residences. The individual who sells the land to the developer, however, will still be
subject to the tax, and some of this added cost will be passed on to the developer. The
tax also applies to the sale of land for vacation residences. It was the original intent of
Governor Salmon that the tax should apply only to these residences and that it include
both land and buildings. Such a tax was thought to be sufficient to deter speculation and
reduce development in the state. Letter from Norris Hoyt, Governor Salmon's tax advisor,
to George F. Carpinello, Nov. 26, 1973.
55. The Vermont plan, in fact, provides for such a distribution of funds. Whatever
revenues are derived from the gains tax will be used, in combination with General
Revenue-Sharing Funds (pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-63 (Supp. 1972)) to provide property
tax relief to permanent residents. This unique credit plan ensures that most residents
will pay property taxes no greater than a set percentage of their households' annual in-
come. The percentage each household will pay varies from four to six percent, depend-
ing on income. In no case, however, would the household be entitled to a credit greater
than $500. 32 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5961-77 (Supp. 1974).
56. The primary purpose of the Vermont tax plan is to deter land speculation. See
note 54 supra.
57. See M. SELDIN & R. SWESNiK, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT STRATEGY 122-24 (1970),
cited in Walker, Some Observations on Land Value Taxation, TAx POLICY, June-July
1971, at 6-8.
58. See Waxman, Financing of Land Investment, 7 REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRtACTICE
87, 91-102 (PLI Transcript Ser., 1969). Waxman discusses at length the need for an early
cash flow in order to induce noninstitutional lenders to finance the project:
In most cases the secondary lender will not make the loan when the land is not ready
for development because of the costs of carrying land indefinitely at high interest
rates and because the lender can see no ... immediate source of repayment.
Id. at 93.
See also Martin, Remote Land: Development or Exploitation, UR13AN LAND, Feb. 1971, at
6, where the nature of recreational development is discussed:
All of the developer's efforts are designed to sell as many lots as he can in the
shortest possible time, deferring as much of the project's major construction costs for
as long as possible in order to generate a positive cash flow quickly.
This need for an immediate cash flow is not a problem solely for a small developer. In
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the gains tax would force the developer to delay his sales to the point
where the costs of waiting begin to exceed the tax payments. Of
course, some or all of the increased costs might be passed on to the
home buyer, depending on the demand for housing. But whatever the
elasticity of demand, the inevitable effect would be some combination
of higher prices for homes and less construction.
Although such an increase in the cost of housing would inhibit
migration into the state, this cost might be offset by the savings gained
from the property tax relief plan. However, the amount of savings that
would accrue is not clear. For some residents, particularly those in the
upper income brackets, the measure would provide no relief. For
others, the savings could be pitifully short of the increased cost of their
homes; and even if they recouped the added cost, the savings in later
years would not help them meet the relatively immediate cost of pur-
chasing their home. In addition, the tax relief would not benefit highly
mobile residents who had left the state before the savings became
available."9
Faced with evidence of a reduced ability to move into and settle
in a state, a court would have to determine if legitimate state interests
outweighed the burden on travel and if alternative means would fur-
ther the state interest without being unnecessarily burdensome on
travel.60 Certainly the reduction in overall development caused by the
gains tax would ease pollution problems and leave a greater propor-
tion of the state's land in its natural state. However, a statewide tax
would apply equally in all areas, thereby discouraging development
in urban areas and forest lands alike. Such a plan would not be par-
ticularly effective in singling out those areas in need of special pro-
tection, and therefore would be unnecessarily burdensome on access
their study of large-scale developments, planning experts Gladstone and Wilburn con-
structed a hypothetical "prototypical large multi-use project" to illustrate how large-scale
developments are financed. In the model, the land and buildings were being sold as soon
as possible after acquisition in order to generate sufficient cash flows, and six years
after acquisition approximately one-half of the residential land had been sold. Wilburn &
Gladstone, Optimizing Development Profits in Large Scale Real Estate Projects, URBAN
LAND INsrITUTE Technical Bulletin No. 67, 1972, at 44-47.
59. Moreover, since the land gains tax would probably raise the price of all housing
in the state, it would also raise the assessed value of each home. Thus, some people
would not only fail to receive a tax rebate, but might also have to pay a higher annual
property tax.
60. The Vermont tax, as originally enacted, was challenged unsuccessfully by a group
of developers. Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 315 A.2d 860 (1974). The plaintiffs
alleged that the tax violated their rights to due process and equal protection. The
Vermont supreme court easily rejected these claims, relying upon the many precedents
that require considerable judicial restraint when taxes are challenged under either of
those clauses. See p. 1576 supra. The plaintiffs apparently did not consider a claim
based on freedom of travel, although they did allege that the tax deterred citizens from
other states from buying and selling land in Vermont. Brief for Appellants at 19-20.
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to the state.01 One way that environmental preservation could be better
achieved is by a well-tailored state zoning plan. 2 Such a plan could,
for example, allow high-density development while providing open
space by means of cluster zoning.63 In addition, it could tailor the
uses to the types of land: town houses in urban areas, more single
family residences in urban fringes, and relatively little development
in special ecological preserves. A carefully drafted zoning scheme would
limit development only in those areas where the possibility of environ-
mental damage was a real concern. Clearly, the use of such a zoning
scheme would also limit access to the state, but it would be free from
challenge under the balancing-means test because it would further
substantial environmental interests in a way that would not be un-
necessarily burdensome on travel. 4
Those challenging the gains tax would also have to show that the
revenue-raising interests of the state did not outbalance the limitation
upon access. Maintaining its fiscal integrity is of paramount concern
to the state. Yet, the means chosen in this case do not substantially
further that goal. Increment taxes-i.e., taxes levied at the time of
transfer-are by nature peculiarly poor devices for raising revenue.
Once the rate is raised high enough to insure sufficient revenue, land
is traditionally withheld from the market.65 Moreover, rather than rais-
61. It has been argued that the Vermont land gains tax, by deterring speculation and
the rapid turnover of land, furthers four public objectives: reducing accelerated and
inefficient development, helping to preserve community aesthetic values, taxing windfall
profits, and decreasing the pressure on land prices and resultant property taxes. Note, 49
WASH. L. REV. 1159, 1161-65. But the first two objectives may be dealt with more directly
through land use regulations which prescribe the location and character of development.
The third objective could be furthered by a simple windfall profits tax. Finally, the
fourth objective is not in the general welfare if what is sought is an escape from the
costs of population growth. See note 66 infra. Moreover, if the state wishes to ease the
burden of property taxes on certain of its residents, it may readjust its revenue-raising
activities in numerous ways that are less burdensome on access and the right to travel.
62. Vermont has already enacted a statewide zoning plan, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§
6001-89. (Supp. 1974), which divides the state into various zoning districts and requires
the developer to meet several environmental and health conditions before developments
of a certain size can be built. For a discussion of the Vermont plan, see E. BOSSELMIAN R
D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REvOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (Council of Environmental
Quality 1971).
63. Compared to usual zoning plans, cluster zoning is "a more flexible form of
residential subdivision" in which "the number of houses is about the same, but they are
clustered more closely together in order to release the remainder of the land for use as
shared open space." K. KULMALA, CLUSTER ZONING IN MASSACHUSETrs 1 (1970). For an
example of judicial approval of such zoning, see note 33 supra.
64. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the prior discussion of exclusionary zoning.
See pp. 1572-74 supra. Those zoning plans prevented rather than accommodated growth,
and therefore unnecessarily interfered with access. In contrast, the statewide scheme out-
lined in the text would be narrowly drawn and would strike a reasonable balance between
growth and environmental preservation.
65. The British experimented with an increment tax in the early part of this century
and again after the Second World War. Both times, the plan was eventually rejected be-
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ing additional revenue, the gains tax merely effects a redistribution
of funds from the future residents to the present ones. Whatever
revenue is raised by the tax will be used to grant property tax relief
to present residents. These residents would thus receive a property tax
bonus solely because new residents would be forced to pay more for
their homes. Current residents would also reap a further tax bonus
at the expense of those deterred from moving to the state. Property
tax burdens would be lower because a decrease in the number of new
residents would reduce the need for new public facilities. In effect,
then, the tax would be a means whereby the present residents could
escape the costs of growth, and that is a goal which is insufficient to
justify a burden on access. 66
Conclusion
This Note has been an attempt to show that the right to travel exists
as an independent right outside the equal protection context, that
it is applicable to cases involving exclusionary land use regulations
based on the police or fiscal powers, and that it has major advantages
over the general welfare standard for dealing with such exclusionary
measures. A balancing-means standard was proposed for evaluating
governmental action that has the effect of inhibiting the ability of
persons to travel and settle in a new municipality or state. Under
this standard, a state or locality would have to show that the legislation
in question furthered substantial state interests and was not unneces-
sarily burdensome on the right to travel.
cause landowners withheld land from the market to avoid the tax. See Ilersic, Land
Values and Levies in the U.K., 26 CANADIAN TAX J., 416-19 (1968), cited in Walker, Taxa-
tion of Land Value Increases, TAx POLICY, Aug.-Sept. 1971, at 9. See D. N-ER, EcoNoMICs
OF THE PRoPERTY TAX 212-13 (Brookings Institution 1966):
Revenue from the tax, if levied only at the time of transfer of ownership, cannot
be large enough to form a complete replacement for the present property tax: if
the rate is low, the yield will be minor and if high will encourage owners to post-
pone realization.
66. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super 11, 283
A.2d 353 (L. Div. 1971), in which the town sought to reduce or limit the tax burden upon
the present residents by restricting the number of multiple-unit dwellings and increasing
the minimum lot size requirements. By thus limiting access to the community, the present
residents hoped to keep down the expenditures which were needed to accommodate future
residents. The court found such an interest irrelevant to general welfare goals and hence
outweighed by the need for accommodation of increased population in the region. See
also Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 43 U.S.L.W.
2399, 2400 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Mar. 24, 1975).
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The ultimate responsibility for defining and protecting the consti-
tutional right to travel rests with the judiciary. Precedents in other
areas give guidance to the courts as to how this responsibility should
be fulfilled. The use of the balancing-means test in the commerce and
First Amendment cases provides the parameters within which travel
claims may be evaluated, and the many exclusionary zoning cases il-
lustrate how the travel right may be balanced against local interests
in the context of land use regulation. The important point, however,
is that the interests in every case should be balanced according to an
explicit and practical standard. Only in this way can the competing
individual and societal interests be reasonably accommodated.
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